"Recent evidence suggests that macroeconomic outcomes are inferior in countries operating under presidential regimes compared with those with parliaments, with lower levels of economic growth, higher rates of inflation, and higher levels of income inequality in countries with presidential governments. Despite this, more heads of state look to consolidate and build their executive power. This book considers why presidential regimes, in particular, are so bad for the economy. Throughout the book, the authors comprehensively and simultaneously consider the impact of legal, political and economic institutions in the mechanisms. It is first demonstrated that presidential countries have (on average) inferior outcomes to parliamentary states with respect to these institutions, and moreover, with respect to healthcare and human development indicators. Subsequently, the book explores the impact of constitutional choice (parliamentary versus presidential) on these institutions, and both on macroeconomic outcomes. It is argued that having a presidential regime causes weaker institutions, but that quality institutions can mitigate some of the negative impacts from such regimes. This book marks a significant contribution to the literature on political economics, constitutional political economy, macroeconomics and forms of government"-- Provided by publisher.