Includes bibliographical references (p. 683-747) and indexes.

Introduction -- The reason for collective choice-allocative efficiency -- The reason for collective choice-redistribution -- The choice of voting rule -- Majority rule-positive properties -- Majority rule-normative properties -- Simple alternatives to majority rule -- Complicated alternetives to majority rule -- Exit, voice and disloyalty -- Federalism -- Two-party competition-deterministic voting -- Two-party competition-probabilistic voting -- Multiparty systems -- The paradox of voting -- Rent seeking -- Bureaucracy -- Legislatures and bureaucracies -- Dictatorship -- Political competition and macroeconomic performance -- Interest groups, campaign contributions and lobbying -- The size of government -- Government size and economic performance -- Social welfare functions -- The impossibility of a social ordering -- A just social contract -- The constitution as a utilitarian contract -- Liberal rights and social choices -- Has public choice contributed anything to the study of politics? -- Allocation, redistribution and public choice.